France's Anti-68 Liberal Revival by Stewart, IG
 In the tenth anniversary issue of the intellectual journal  Commentaire , the 
economist Christian Stoffaës remarked that, since the journal’s birth in 
1978, France had undergone a ‘liberal revolution’ in which Marxism had 
been displaced from its position of ideological dominance by the rediscovery 
of the country’s liberal heritage.  1  As the intellectual historian Mark Lilla has 
noted, other continental European countries experienced a similar collapse 
in the intellectual respectability of Marxism during this period, but only in 
France was this accompanied by a major revival of the domestic liberal 
tradition.  2  Both Stoffaës and Lilla viewed this development with considerable 
satisfaction, but of course the ideological reorientation of the French 
intelligentsia in these years was not always so warmly received. In 1983, 
Perry Anderson famously remarked that in the space of a few years Paris 
had made the transition from a beacon of revolutionary politics to ‘the 
capital of European intellectual reaction’, an argument that continues to 
echo on the contemporary French left in the work of Daniel Lindenberg and 
François Cusset.  3  
 Yet radical evaluative disagreement over France’s ‘liberal revolution’ exists 
alongside a basic empirical agreement over the extent of the ideological 
transformation that occurred in France between the late 1970s and 1980s: 
whatever they think of its content, all the commentators mentioned above 
would agree that something akin to an ideological revolution occurred in 
France in these years. The need to develop our understanding of the content 
and complexities of this phenomenon is a major priority for contemporary 
intellectual historians of France since the 1970s.  4  Much of the work published 
on this topic in the 1990s tended to reduce the complexities of France’s 
intellectual revolution to an ‘anti- totalitarian turn’ in the mid- to late 1970s. In 
this narrative, the French publication of Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s  The Gulag 
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Archipelago in 1974 triggered a collective epiphany among France’s intellectuals, 
leading them to abandon Marxism and to embrace a half- forgotten liberal 
tradition.  5  Although there is an element of truth in this argument, such narratives 
obscure more than they reveal. There were, for instance, different kinds of anti- 
totalitarianism. While some anti- totalitarian intellectuals championed the cause 
of human rights, others regarded this as a utopian illusion.  6  Indeed, not all anti- 
totalitarian intellectuals claimed to be liberals, and those that were active in the 
recovery of France’s liberal tradition in these years entered into this project with 
signifi cantly different objectives. Like the Revolution of 1789, the historiography 
of which was being fundamentally contested in this period, France’s liberal 
revolution was not a bloc. 
 This chapter builds on, and is a contribution towards, the new 
historiography of France’s intellectual transformation in the 1970s and 
1980s. In particular, it follows recent work by Michael Scott Christofferson 
and Julian Bourg in de- emphasising the importance of a mythical ‘anti- 
totalitarian moment’ and stressing the importance of longer- term factors in 
the transformation of the French intellectual landscape, particularly the 
impact of the  événements of May–June 1968.  7  Unlike Bourg or Christofferson, 
however, the focus here will be specifi cally on the revival of the French liberal 
tradition in these years. Through a historical analysis of the contribution 
made by the journals  Contrepoint and  Commentaire to this revival, I identify 
a specifi c form of liberal revivalism that emerged as a hostile response to the 
upheavals of 1968.  8  In line with their explicit commitment to intellectual 
pluralism, contributors to  Commentaire and  Contrepoint sometimes 
cooperated with other liberal revivalists and anti- totalitarians; however, the 
two journals’ anti-68 origins clearly shaped their interpretation of the French 
liberal tradition that they were programmatically committed to reviving. 
What distinguished the liberal revivalism of these journals was that it was 
tied to a specifi c project aimed at reforming French political culture. Anti- 
totalitarianism played an important rhetorical role in this project. But it was 
the interrelated critiques of radical egalitarianism, relativist ‘anti- humanism’, 
and intellectual ‘irresponsibility’ that fundamentally shaped the liberal 
revivalism promoted by  Contrepoint and  Commentaire and marked it out 
from alternative readings of France’s liberal tradition in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 Raymond Aron and the roots of the 
French liberal revival 
 During an interview in 1981, the political sociologist and commentator 
Raymond Aron remarked with amusement that for the fi rst time his work 
was on the verge of becoming fashionable.  9  At this point, towards the end of 
his life, he was undergoing a reputational transformation. Ever since his 
conversion to militant anti- communism at the onset of the Cold War had 
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caused him to break with his friend Jean-Paul Sartre, Aron had been shunned 
by a French intellectual left where it was supposedly considered ‘better to be 
wrong with Sartre than right with Aron’. The relative popularity of these two 
men has often since been used as a kind of shorthand for the ideological 
orientation of the French intelligentsia. The historian Tony Judt summed up 
the dramatic political changes that swept the French intellectual landscape in 
the late 1970s and 1980s as the building of ‘a monument to Aronian reason’ 
upon ‘the funeral pyre of Sartrean radicalism’, an analysis echoed in 2005 by 
the then French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, who noted with 
satisfaction that ‘the majority of intellectuals [now] prefer to be right with 
Aron than wrong with Sartre’.  10  However, the origins of Aron’s reputational 
transformation lie not in any radical change in his own work, but rather in 
France’s ‘anti- totalitarian moment’ of the mid- to late 1970s.  11  The revival of 
the French liberal tradition, which accelerated amid this anti- totalitarian 
turn, also contributed to Aron’s intellectual ascendency in these years. Not 
only was Aron one of France’s earliest theorists of totalitarianism, but he had 
pioneered the rediscovery of the French liberal tradition long before this 
became fashionable in the late 1970s and 1980s. French liberal revivalists 
such as François Furet, Marcel Gauchet and Pierre Manent read authors like 
Tocqueville and Constant through the prism of their contemporary anti- 
totalitarianism, and in doing so some of these fi gures were infl uenced by 
Raymond Aron.  12  Nevertheless, just as it would be a mistake to regard the 
liberal revival and anti- totalitarianism as two sides of the same coin, Aron’s 
own liberal revivalism cannot be simply reduced to his anti- totalitarianism. 
 Aron’s earliest work on the subject of totalitarianism was published on 
the eve of the Second World War, but it was not until the late 1950s that his 
refl ection on this issue began to draw explicitly on the French liberal 
tradition for inspiration.  13  A central and infl uential contention of his theory 
was that democracy and totalitarianism were not opposites but rather that 
the latter was the pathological product of a malfunctioning democratic 
political culture. Although he originally developed this argument under the 
infl uence of radically anti- liberal thinkers such as Carl Schmitt, in the late 
1950s Aron turned to Montesquieu’s  The Spirit of the Laws to rework his 
theory for the book  Democracy and Totalitarianism (1965).  14  Here Aron 
maintained his earlier emphasis on the problem of political culture, but 
articulated this by using Montesquieu’s vocabulary of the ‘principle’ of a 
regime and the problem of its corruption. He followed Montesquieu by 
defi ning the principle of a political regime as a set of social attitudes without 
which such a regime cannot function. For liberal democracies, this principle 
was a combination of respect for legality and a spirit of compromise, and 
the underlying importance of these attributes remained implicit in his 
subsequent work that engaged more substantially with France’s liberal 
tradition.  15  As we shall see, some of these later instances of Aron’s French 
liberal revivalism also involved a corresponding shift away from some of his 
formative German intellectual infl uences. 
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 Democracy and Totalitarianism was the last in a trilogy of books based 
upon lectures given at the Sorbonne between 1955 and 1958, which was 
the period in which Aron fi rst began seriously to study Montesquieu and 
Tocqueville.  16  Ironically, given the title of this book, these were years in which 
the language of international anti- communism was moving away from the 
aggressive and emotive anti- totalitarian discourse of the early Cold War and 
towards an ostensibly more objective comparative analysis of Capitalist and 
Communist forms of ‘industrial society’.  17  One of the features of this rhetorical 
shift was the emergence of what came to be known as ‘end of ideology’ theory. 
In the mid- to late 1950s, Raymond Aron was France’s leading proponent of 
this theory.  18  The degree of optimism with which it was articulated varied, but 
proponents of the end of ideology shared the fundamental assumption that 
sustained economic growth, managed by a moderately interventionist state 
in cooperation with labour and enterprise, could simultaneously deliver 
increasing levels of wages, benefi ts, profi ts and investment.  19  By thus aligning 
the interests of workers and employers, a new ‘politics of productivity’ would 
replace the old politics of class confl ict, rendering traditional ideological 
distinctions between left and right redundant in the process.  20  Because it 
embraced the mixed economy and a moderate degree of state economic 
planning, end of ideology theory received a hostile reception from neoliberals 
committed to a revival of classical economic liberalism.  21  But for liberals like 
Aron, this post- ideological vision was the basis on which a healthy democratic 
political culture of legality and compromise could be built in France. 
 Françoise Mélonio has linked France’s post-Second World War Tocqueville 
revival to the emergence of this end of ideology theory.  22  Given Tocqueville’s 
famous concerns over the extension of the powers of the centralised state, 
this is not an obvious connection to make even if Tocqueville could be 
mobilised in support of end of ideology theory in other ways.  23  In Aron’s 
case, instead of referring to the author of  Democracy in America to support 
the detail of his analysis, he set up a comparison between Tocqueville and 
Marx’s predictive accuracy in relation to the issue of equality. The point here 
was to suggest that, under the infl uence of sustained economic growth, the 
development of post-Second World War western democracies confi rmed 
Tocqueville’s predictions of rising social equality in democratic capitalist 
societies and contradicted Marx’s opposite vision of the pauperisation of the 
working class.  24  Another way in which Tocqueville resonated with Aron’s end 
of ideology argument was in his critique of intellectuals’ alleged propensity 
for a moralising and unrealistic form of ‘literary politics’.  25  One of the 
principal obstacles to a political culture of legality and compromise that Aron 
consistently identifi ed and critiqued throughout his career was the alleged 
irresponsibility of France’s public intellectuals, and it is signifi cant that he 
fi rst articulated his end of ideology theory in the conclusion to his famous 
polemical work  L’Opium des Intellectuels (1955).  26  However, it is important 
to recognise that Aron’s theorisation of intellectual irresponsibility predated 
his encounter with Tocqueville in the 1950s; instead, it originated in his 
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reading of Max Weber’s work on the political ethics of responsibility and 
conviction during the early 1930s.  27  As with his adaptation of Montesquieu 
to reformulate his comparative analysis of democratic and totalitarian states, 
Tocqueville was not a formative infl uence but rather an adaptive one. 
 If Aron used aspects of Montesquieu and Tocqueville’s work to inform 
elements of his own theories of totalitarianism and the end of ideology 
between 1955 and 1958, it was not until 1959–60 that he positioned his 
work more explicitly and comprehensively within this liberal lineage. The 
key text here, sometimes referred to as a foundational moment in the wider 
French liberal revival, is his  Les Étapes de la pensée sociologique , published 
in 1967 but based upon lectures on the history of sociological thought given 
at the Sorbonne eight years earlier.  28  Here Aron cast himself for the fi rst time 
as a ‘belated descendent’ of Montesquieu and Tocqueville, whom he identifi ed 
as the founders of a ‘French school of political sociology’ that was in 
opposition to the infl uential positivist and Marxist traditions.  29  By claiming 
this lineage, Aron was attempting both to legitimise his own brand of anti- 
positivist, anti-Marxist political sociology and reinforce its epistemological 
basis.  30  In referring to himself as a ‘belated descendent’ of the liberal tradition, 
Aron tacitly acknowledged the fact that he had developed his sociological 
perspective in the 1930s entirely independently of these retrospectively 
selected French liberal predecessors. Before the Second World War, his main 
infl uences were a series of German thinkers including Wilhelm Dilthey, 
Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and, above all, Max Weber. 
 In his second book,  Introduction à la philosophie de l’histoire (1938), 
Aron combined these German infl uences to inform a relativistic critique of 
the epistemological position of Marxism on the basis of which he argued 
for a sociologically informed, gradualist and broadly liberal ‘politics of 
understanding’.  31  This was Aron’s version of Weber’s ethic of responsibility. In 
his memoirs, Aron identifi ed the  Introduction as having established the 
fundamental basis of all his subsequent political thought, but the problem with 
this book was that its radically relativistic attack on Marxism and positivism 
seemed to remove the possibility of attaining the kind of objective knowledge 
upon which responsible, sociologically informed decision- making was to be 
based.  32  Furthermore, from a moral perspective, Aron’s epistemological 
relativism provided an insubstantial normative basis for his defence of moderate 
liberal democracy.  33  It was partly to address these issues that Aron turned to a 
more comprehensive analysis of Montesquieu and Tocqueville in 1959. 
 Infl uenced in part by Leo Strauss’s critique of Max Weber’s moral 
relativism,  34  one of Aron’s priorities in the late 1950s and early 1960s was to 
explore the possibilities for a modern political science that combined 
empirical rigour with a renewed sensitivity to the normative concerns of 
classical political philosophy. This is one of the things that attracted him to 
the work of Montesquieu and Tocqueville in these years. Like Weber, they 
were pluralistic, probabilistic thinkers who refused mono- causal determinism, 
but their interpretative pluralism did not overextend into a radical relativism 
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that undermined empirical objectivity or denied the possibility of rationally 
grounded value judgements. For Aron, Montesquieu and Tocqueville were to 
be admired as political sociologists ‘who never cease to judge at the same 
time as [they] describe’.  35  This concern with establishing a political sociology 
that combined modern empirical methods with a classical philosophical 
sensibility was partly a response to growing criticism of the end of ideology 
theory in the late 1950s. Because it apparently reduced a political problem to 
the technical issue of managing economic productivity, end of ideology 
theory came to be linked to growing concerns about a crisis of normative 
political philosophy in the late 1950s and early 1960s.  36  This critique of end 
of ideology theory on classical philosophical grounds was soon compounded 
by a more radical attack from the emergent New Left that led Aron to draw 
further upon Tocqueville in formulating his response.  37  
 The ideological development of the New Left in France and elsewhere 
during the 1960s was partly a critical response to trends that end of ideology 
theorists had celebrated, notably the rise of the consumer society and the 
decline of the working class as a revolutionary force. This response involved 
highlighting the persistence of shocking inequalities within consumer societies, 
exploring the phenomena of alienation and anomie that accompanied growing 
prosperity, and critiquing post- war technocratic elitism in the name of a direct 
democracy that would extend beyond the traditional political arena to all 
spheres of social life through the promotion of self- management ( autogestion ). 
Aron responded to the new ideological challenge posed by the New Left 
through a theory of the ‘dialectic of equality’ that drew heavily upon 
Tocqueville for inspiration.  38  His main disagreement was with the infl uential 
neo-Marxism of Herbert Marcuse. Aron argued that the alienation and 
anomie that had accompanied the post- war economic miracle were not so 
much products of capitalism as they were inherent within the insatiable 
egalitarian appetite of modern democracy. This impulse was at once stimulated 
and frustrated by an industrial civilisation that provided rising material 
prosperity but whose inevitably hierarchical character obstructed the same 
egalitarian desires that growing productivity had helped to create. Although 
rising post- war prosperity served in part to lessen the appeal of revolutionary 
political ideologies, it could not provide reasons for living. Thus while in one 
sense it engendered social conservatism, at the same time it fed a spiritual 
revolt whose privileged expression during the 1960s was a rise in demands for 
enhanced participation and self- management and a critique of hierarchical 
bureaucracies that was keenly felt in the Gaullist Fifth Republic. 
 The explosion of such demands amid the libertarian contestation that 
marked the events of May and June 1968 in France prompted Aron to 
reformulate this Tocquevillian critique along more aggressively polemical 
lines.  39  He refused to take the actions of students and intellectuals during the 
crisis seriously and, convinced that they were indulging in pseudo- revolutionary 
agitation against a consumer society of whose material benefi ts they were 
among the principal benefi ciaries, he labelled the events a ‘psychodrama’.  40  
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Although in this regard Aron’s analysis was dismissive, in another sense he 
took the events of May 1968 extremely seriously. The explosion of discontent 
in 1968 signifi ed a profound moral crisis, which he diagnosed by adapting 
Tocqueville’s theory of the importance of religion in restraining the egalitarian 
impulse of democratic societies. By 1968, he suggested, the moral bases of a 
necessary minimum respect for legally constituted authority in France had 
been undermined not only by a long- term decline in the infl uence of religion 
over social mores, but also by the more recent erosion of atheistic humanism 
as an alternative source of moral principles with which to tame the insatiable 
egalitarian appetite of student radicals and the irresponsible intellectuals that 
indulged them.  41  
 Aron’s liberal revivalism, then, developed in a number of directions between 
1955 and 1968, all of which were driven by his overriding preoccupation 
with the problem of developing and maintaining a democratic political culture 
based on the principles of legality and compromise. Aron fi rst articulated this 
in the terminology of Montesquieu’s  De l’Esprit des lois when revising his 
theory of totalitarianism, but in most respects his recovery of the liberal 
tradition in these years cannot be reduced to his anti- totalitarianism. It was 
related to a project of epistemological revision undertaken in the context of a 
crisis of political philosophy, and it informed and legitimised both a critique 
of radical egalitarianism and of the postmodern anti- humanism with which 
Aron associated the emergence of radical egalitarian ideologies in France. 
Tocqueville was the primary point of reference for the latter critiques, and 
increasingly came to displace Max Weber as the inspiration for Aron’s critique 
of intellectual irresponsibility and its pernicious infl uence upon French 
political culture.  42  Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate the role of 
Tocqueville: it is signifi cant, for instance, that Aron largely ignored a number 
of key tenets of Tocqueville’s thought, including his economic liberalism and 
his emphasis on the importance of associational life in maintaining a healthy 
democratic political culture. The latter point is particularly noteworthy 
because defenders of the legacy of May 1968 typically point to its positive 
impact on associational life in France during the 1970s.  43  Aron, however, was 
France’s leading intellectual critic of the  événements , and, as we shall see 
below, this was the single most important factor in bringing together a group 
of like- minded younger intellectuals that would form the core editorial teams 
of two ‘Aronian’ journals dedicated to reviving France’s liberal tradition. 
 The origins and orientations of  Contrepoint 
and  Commentaire 
 Prior to the publication of his famous anti-68 essay,  La Révolution 
introuvable (1968), Aron gave a running commentary on the events in his 
columns for the conservative daily  Le Figaro . On 11 June 1968, he used this 
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column to publish an appeal for the formation of a ‘Committee for the 
Defence and Renovation of the French University’.  44  Although the committee 
itself was short- lived, the group of intellectuals that rallied to Aron’s appeal 
continued to interact through his weekly seminar at the École pratique des 
hautes études. It was through the network established there that the journal 
 Contrepoint was founded in May 1970.  45   Contrepoint was the fi rst French 
journal explicitly committed to reviving France’s liberal tradition of political 
thought, and its liberal revivalism was closely related to its origins in Aron’s 
intellectual reaction against May 68.  46  Timing the launch to coincide with 
the second anniversary of the  événements was a deliberate move, and the 
journal, which carried a different quotation from Tocqueville on each of its 
mastheads, regularly published articles devoted to studying aspects of the 
moral crisis that Aron had diagnosed in  La Révolution introuvable . Thus, 
for instance, the editorial in the fi rst issue of  Contrepoint claimed that it was 
committed to combating ‘the nihilist anarchism of the dominant group of 
intellectuals’ and the radically egalitarian, anti- authoritarian ideologies 
espoused by the various leftist groups that had sprung up in the wake of 
1968.  47  Its early editions were special issues treating such themes as ‘liberty 
and authority’, ‘the state of the youth’, ‘the origins of the malaise’ and ‘the 
situation of the intellectuals’.  Contrepoint was particularly critical of those 
intellectuals – most prominently Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari – whose relativist anti- humanism was regarded 
as the philosophical basis for the nihilistic libertarianism of the  soixante- 
huitard radicals.  48  
 Contrepoint was an anti- totalitarian journal, but its anti- totalitarianism 
was expansively defi ned in response to the post-68 landscape of left- wing 
politics in France. A signifi cant feature of this landscape was the crystallisation 
of radical left- wing forms of anti- communism. Groups such as Gauche 
Prolétarienne existed to the left of (and in opposition to) the French 
Communist Party (PCF), often espousing a ‘third worldist’ ideology inspired 
by the examples of Communist China, Vietnam or Cuba rather than the 
Soviet Union.  Contrepoint ’s anti- totalitarianism therefore extended beyond 
the PCF and USSR to embrace Communist regimes in the developing world 
and the revolutionary leftism in France, which, notwithstanding its own 
opposition to the PCF, was accused of opening the door to Communist 
subversion by destabilising the liberal order.  49  These concerns intensifi ed 
from 1972 with the signing of the Common Programme between the PCF 
and the Socialist Party, which established the prospect of Communists 
entering government in France for the fi rst time since the start of the Cold 
War. The wider anti- totalitarian turn in France developed following the 
scandal surrounding Solzhenitsyn’s  The Gulag Archipelago and media 
coverage of atrocities and humanitarian crises in Cambodia and Vietnam, 
but was itself in large part a response to the re- emergence of the PCF as a 
potential party of government.  50   Contrepoint , however, was unable fully to 
take advantage of the more propitious intellectual environment that began 
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to develop in 1974 because personal differences between the journal’s 
directors, Georges Liébert and Patrick Devedjian, led to the former’s 
resignation, the withdrawal of Raymond Aron’s support for the project and, 
shortly thereafter, the journal’s termination at the end of 1976.  51  
 While  Contrepoint never achieved a circulation that would enable it to 
compete with more established publications such as  Esprit or  Les Temps 
modernes , it nevertheless carried a degree of infl uence in the entourage of 
the centre- right politician Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, who admired the journal 
and wanted it to operate as a kind of think tank for the development of his 
brand of ‘advanced liberalism’.  52  Although this invitation was declined, both 
 Contrepoint and its successor  Commentaire retained close links to Giscard 
d’Estaing and the governments that served under his presidency between 
1974 and 1981. Jean-Claude Casanova, a key fi gure in the running of both 
journals, served as an advisor to Raymond Barre during the latter’s time in 
offi ce as Prime Minister between 1976 and 1981.  53  Raymond Aron served 
as an informal advisor during the election campaigns of 1978 and 1981 and 
had previously taught Giscard d’Estaing, Raymond Barre and Alain 
Peyrefi tte (who was Minister of Justice between 1977 and 1981) at the École 
nationale d’administration and Sciences Po.  54  The close ties that existed 
between  Contrepoint, Commentaire and Sciences Po were signifi cant from 
an ideological as well as a sociological point of view. The latter institution 
originated from the École libre des sciences politiques founded in 1872 to 
train France’s new political and administrative élite following the Franco-
Prussian War. Its name had changed following its part nationalisation after 
the Second World War, when Raymond Aron joined its teaching staff, but 
across its different incarnations Sciences Po was closely associated with the 
preservation of France’s liberal tradition of political thought.  55  The variety 
of liberalism with which this institution tended to be associated was one 
that was more or less elitist and for which the value of democracy was 
secondary to that of liberty.  56  
 The journal  Commentaire was founded in March 1978 and its editorial 
team was largely composed from the group that had coalesced under Aron’s 
tutelage ten years earlier. Liébert and Devedjian, the younger alumni of 
Sciences Po that had driven the establishment of  Contrepoint , were replaced 
by the more experienced and well- connected Jean-Claude Casanova, alongside 
the young political philosopher Pierre Manent and the historian Marc 
Fumaroli. Unlike at  Contrepoint , where he played a fairly inconspicuous role, 
Raymond Aron was presented as the public face of  Commentaire . The journal 
was advertised to prospective subscribers as an initiative taken by Aron with 
the aim of contributing to the intellectual and political reform of France. The 
means by which this reform would be pursued were the promotion of liberal 
pluralism and the rejection of dogmatic intellectual conformism.  57  The latter 
had been a prominent and recurrent theme in  Contrepoint , which was more 
overtly combative than its successor and placed less of an emphasis on its 
intellectual pluralism.  58  This tonal shift was a refl ection of the newly emerging 
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intellectual landscape in France at the time. Still, there were limits to 
 Commentaire ’s embrace of alternative ideological outlooks. Although it 
positioned itself as an anti- totalitarian journal, its inaugural editorial was 
scornful of the ‘telegenic’ and ‘lightweight’ New Philosophers, former radicals 
such as Bernard-Henri Lévy and André Glucksmann who had become famous 
following their anti- totalitarian conversions.  59  
 It is signifi cant in this regard that  Commentaire did not position itself 
merely as an anti- totalitarian journal; it was opposed to what it identifi ed as 
the  two major threats to liberal democracy: ‘the inarticulate cry of pure revolt 
on one side; the absolute knowledge of total ideology on the other’.  60  In railing 
against the fi rst of these enemies of liberty, it picked up from where 
 Contrepoint ’s condemnation of nihilistic libertarianism had left off in 1970. 
Thus, while its opposition to ‘total ideology’ situated  Commentaire within 
a wider fi eld of intellectual anti- totalitarianism, its conservative anti- 
libertarianism distinguished it from other anti- totalitarian journals like  Esprit 
or  Le Débat . The most signifi cant direction in which  Commentaire explicitly 
opened itself to outside collaboration was the anti-Communist,  autogestionnaire 
current within the Socialist Party and the non-Communist trade union, the 
Confédération française démocratique du travail (CFDT). This section of the 
French left was praised in its inaugural editorial for having ‘rediscovered civil 
society’ and being ready to ‘break the fatal equation of socialism and state 
control’. This olive branch proffered to a section of the left was, however, 
conditional upon it ‘demonstrat[ing] that it can be something other than the 
impotent libertarian counterpoint to the statist left’.  61  
 Anti-68 liberal revivalism in comparative 
perspective 
 As we have seen, the French liberal revivalism prosecuted by the intellectuals 
of  Contrepoint and  Commentaire originated primarily in their hostility to 
the events and legacy of May 1968 rather than in the critique of 
totalitarianism. However, this did not prevent them from applying the 
vocabulary of anti- totalitarianism to their readings of the French liberal 
tradition. Articles in  Commentaire ’s ‘Classics of Liberty’ section, which was 
devoted to the rediscovery of predominantly French liberal authors of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, are littered with references to ‘Jacobin 
totalitarianism’, the ‘pre- totalitarian experience’ of the First Empire, or the 
sensitivity to the totalitarian menace of authors such as Hippolyte Taine or 
Benjamin Constant (who ‘somehow foresaw Hitler through Napoleon’).  62  
This anachronistic tendency was a feature of the wider liberal revival that 
accompanied the anti- totalitarian turn; it was not specifi c to authors 
associated with  Commentaire .  63  An explicitly anti- totalitarian interpretation 
of Constant by the pro-68 philosopher Marcel Gauchet was praised in the 
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pages of ‘Classics of Liberty’ by Pierre Manent in 1980, for instance.  64  
Gauchet’s mentor, Claude Lefort, was another pro-68, anti- totalitarian 
liberal revivalist whose work was praised by Manent in  Commentaire .  65  
Closer comparison of Manent and Lefort, however, indicates that, despite 
converging upon the language of anti- totalitarianism, they otherwise offered 
divergent interpretations of the French liberal tradition’s contemporary 
signifi cance. 
 Along with Cornelius Castoriadis, Lefort had been a founder of the anti-
Stalinist journal  Socialisme ou Barbarie , which had been infl uential in 
developing the direct democratic, left- wing anti- communism that was a major 
ideological inspiration for many activists in 1968.  66  That year he had been a 
prominent supporter of the student and workers’ movements, a position for 
which he was criticised by Raymond Aron, who was Lefort’s doctoral 
supervisor and with whom he otherwise had good relations.  67  Meanwhile, 
Pierre Manent was Aron’s assistant at the Collège de France and a director of 
 Commentaire . In 1968 he had begun to frequent Aron’s seminar, which he has 
described as ‘a refuge far from the nave of madmen’ at the École normale 
supérieure where he studied philosophy in an environment dominated by 
Althusserian Marxism.  68  Refl ecting back on the  événements in 2010, Manent 
attributed them partly to a crisis in the teaching of political philosophy in 
France at the time.  69  He retrospectively defi ned his own intellectual project as 
an attempt at rehabilitating an ‘authentic political science’, reconnected to its 
classical philosophical roots and liberated from postmodernist relativism.  70  
 The fi rst major source of inspiration in this enterprise was the work of 
Raymond Aron, and it was Aron who introduced Manent to his second 
main intellectual infl uence, Leo Strauss.  71  Claude Lefort was also an admirer 
of Strauss and Aron, as well as being an important theorist of totalitarianism 
in the 1970s.  72  Lefort and Manent shared Aron’s basic point of view that 
totalitarianism existed as a permanent possibility within democracy itself 
rather than something opposite and external to democracy.  73  And they both 
viewed France’s liberal tradition, with the primacy that it afforded to the 
political domain, as a rich source of inspiration from which to approach 
this issue. The work of Tocqueville in particular was a common point of 
reference, but Lefort and Manent’s readings of Tocqueville emphasised 
contrasting sides of his work, with Manent following Aron’s lead in focusing 
on the problem of the insatiable egalitarian impulse at work in democratic 
societies and Lefort being more interested in Tocqueville’s views on 
associational life as the guarantor of a strong civil society.  74  
 This essential difference between Lefort and Manent became apparent in 
an article by Manent dedicated to Lefort’s writing on democracy and 
totalitarianism, published in the winter of 1981. In this otherwise positive 
assessment of Lefort’s work, Manent took exception to his sympathetic 
evaluation of the contribution made by new social movements committed to 
women’s and gay liberation, ecology, and the causes of the Lip factory 
workers and the farmers of the Larzac. Whereas Lefort saw such movements 
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in a positive light as having helped to reinforce the rights of individuals in 
the face of the state, Manent regarded them as ultimately reinforcing the 
power of the state, as the fi nal guarantor of these rights, and eroding those 
traditional relations of authority – ‘employer over employee, man over 
woman and children . . .’ – belonging to civil society.  75  A year earlier, Manent 
had expressed his views on this issue in more polemical terms:
 All that is needed to make the water diviners of the rue du Mail feel civil 
society bubbling up beneath their feet is for three ecologists, two feminists, 
a community organiser and a pirate radio presenter to meet up somewhere. 
There is something more urgent than liberating civil society from the grip 
of the State: liberating minds from the sterilising grip of the comfort 
blanket concept of civil society.  76  
 The concept of civil society makes for a useful point of comparison from 
which to develop a more specifi c sense of the ways in which  Contrepoint and 
 Commentaire instrumentalised anti- totalitarianism and the French liberal 
tradition to intervene in contemporary social and political debate. That anti- 
totalitarianism was unavoidably a pro- civil society position was made obvious 
by the foundation in 1980 of the independent Solidarity trade union in 
Poland. Yet while this development received signifi cant positive coverage in 
 Commentaire ,  77  the journal’s regular contributors were at best ambivalent 
towards recent developments in French civil society. Whether such developments 
were regarded with friendly scepticism or open hostility depended on an 
implicit distinction at work in ‘Aronian’ liberal commentary between ‘radical’ 
and ‘moderate’ ideal types of French civil society movements. 
 The landslide Gaullist victory in the elections of June 1968 marked the 
immediate political failure of 68 radicalism. In the wake of this failure, 
however, the generalised libertarian contestation of 68 was channelled into 
a wide variety of different single- issue protest organisations, which for the 
purposes of our analysis can be collectively defi ned as the emergence of a 
new radical civil society in France.  78  Two movements emblematic of this 
radical civil society were anti- psychiatry and the campaign for greater 
transparency in the running of France’s prison system.  79  Michel Foucault 
and Gilles Deleuze were among the most prominent intellectuals to become 
involved in these movements, theorising a new form of ‘specifi c’ intellectual 
engagement in the process. By enabling marginalised groups to speak for 
themselves, the engagement of intellectuals like Foucault and Deleuze in 
these movements was intended to be highly practical, but at the same time 
the anti- psychiatry and prisons movements were informed by Foucault 
and Deleuze’s complex poststructuralist theories of power and desire.  80  The 
anti-68 liberal critique of radical civil society often collapsed the critique of 
new social movements into an attack on structuralist and poststructuralist 
anti- humanism and its alleged propensity for irresponsible, libertarian 
nihilism.  81  
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 Tocqueville was again an important point of reference here, as he had been 
in 1968 and before, with Raymond Aron revisiting the nineteenth century 
liberal to critique the anti- psychiatry and prisons movements along with the 
theories of their intellectual advocates. ‘By what aberration or ignorance of 
history,’ Aron asked ‘do so many intellectuals denounce as “repressive” the 
societies that legalise abortion, that tolerate homosexual relationships, that 
give consideration to unions in the armed forces?’  82  From the perspective of 
Deleuze’s defi nition of men as ‘desiring machines’, he argued, all known 
forms of society must appear oppressive, but for Aron ‘what threatens liberal 
Europe is not excessive repression, but license’.  83  In order to explain what he 
described as ‘[t]he conjunction of  paraded license . . . and of  denounced 
repression ’ he drew upon Tocqueville’s account of the origins of the French 
Revolution. In  The Old Regime and the French Revolution , Tocqueville 
had underlined the paradoxical nature of the Revolution given the extent of 
the social liberalisation that had occurred under the absolute monarchy 
compared to in France’s continental European neighbours. His counterintuitive 
explanation for this was that ‘the very destruction of some of the institutions 
of the Middle Ages made those that survived seem all the more detestable’.  84  
Aron turned this specifi c argument into a general principle, explaining that 
the anti- psychiatry and prisons movements were illustrative of what he called 
‘Tocqueville’s Law’. Writing the year before legislative elections that the 
united Socialist and Communist parties were widely expected to win, the 
application of ‘Tocqueville’s Law’ to France’s radical civil society reprised 
Aron’s previous theoretical critiques of insatiable egalitarianism while linking 
it to the practical possibility of a partially Communist government in France. 
 Aron was not the only liberal revivalist associated with  Commentaire to 
draw upon the French liberal tradition to critique egalitarian ideology, its 
intellectual defenders and its infl uence on radical civil society. In his best- 
selling book  Le Mal français , published in 1976, the Gaullist politician Alain 
Peyrefi tte proposed an ‘intellectual and moral reform’ inspired by Ernest 
Renan, stressing the importance of intellectual and political ‘responsibility’ 
while lamenting French intellectuals’ tendencies towards its opposite.  85  
Peyrefi tte, like Aron who had advised him during the preparation of the 
book, called upon Tocqueville to explain and critique the intensifi cation of 
radical egalitarianism in the 1970s.  86  Rather than celebrate the growth 
of associational life in this decade, Peyrefi tte bemoaned its negativity and 
the preponderance of ‘anti- associations’.  87  In other texts published in 
 Commentaire , Peyrefi tte also used Tocqueville’s writings on the penal systems 
in France and the United States to argue against the ‘philanthropic illusions’ 
of both moderate and radical promoters of liberalising prison reforms.  88  
François Bourricaud, who had been Peyrefi tte’s advisor during the latter’s 
ill- fated tenure as Minister of Education in 1968,  89  was another prominent 
liberal revivalist at  Commentaire . A sociologist claiming the lineage set out 
by Aron in  Main Currents of Sociological Thought , Bourricaud was a 
defender of meritocratic elitism. He was worried by a ‘crisis of professional 
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authority’ whose origins he traced to May 68 and the infl uence of thinkers 
like Jacques Lacan and Michel Foucault, ‘sophists’ who paled in comparison 
with the great Tocqueville.  90  
 If the anti-68 liberal revivalists who wrote in the pages of  Commentaire 
were hostile towards the sort of radical civil society represented by the anti- 
psychiatry and prisons movements, they were somewhat more open towards 
the ‘moderate’ developments occurring within the non-Communist trade 
union the CFDT and the  autogestionnaire tendency led by Michel Rocard 
within the Socialist Party. This ‘second left’ differentiated itself from the 
Socialist mainstream by its decentralising, anti- statist leanings and critique 
of the radical nationalising agenda set out in the Common Programme. Its 
chief theorist was Pierre Rosanvallon, who had been the head of the CFDT’s 
youth wing in 1968.  91  Rosanvallon went on to play an important part in the 
French liberal revival, with his egalitarian, radically democratic liberal 
vision refl ecting his activist background. As he put it in the mid-1970s:
 The original liberal project was to develop an authentic civil society 
against the project of a totalitarian State . . . Liberalism is thus above all 
a theory of the separation of powers and of the limitation of the power 
of the State, but in the framework of an egalitarian society.  92  
 The anachronistic reference to totalitarianism in this passage from Rosanvallon’s 
book  L’Âge de l’autogestion (1976) situates it within the general context of 
France’s anti- totalitarian turn, but its egalitarian emphasis sets it apart from 
the anti-68 liberal revivalists of  Commentaire and aligns Rosanvallon with the 
radical democratic critique of Claude Lefort. After meeting Lefort and studying 
his work in the early 1970s, Rosanvallon was persuaded that the best way to 
theorise  autogestion would be to do so in the light of refl ection on the nature 
of totalitarianism and the latter’s democratic origins. For Rosanvallon, as for 
Lefort, this entailed a reading of France’s liberal tradition of political thought, 
which emphasised themes of decentralisation and civil association as bulwarks 
against the totalitarian menace. Whereas anti-68 liberal revivalists like Aron 
and Manent were preoccupied with tempering an insatiable egalitarian impulse 
inherent to modern democratic societies, Rosanvallon’s theory of  autogestion 
represented an attempt to harness this impulse in the service of a new, radically 
democratic form of political liberalism. 
 As we have seen,  Commentaire ’s attitude towards the second left was 
ambivalent: insofar as it was anti-Communist and sceptical of the statist 
socialism of the Common Programme, this was a section of the left to be 
welcomed into the journal’s pluralist embrace.  93  But its egalitarian and direct 
democratic leanings also made it an object of suspicion; hence the suggestion 
in the journal’s inaugural editorial that the second left must abandon 
irresponsible libertarianism and stop ‘hoping eternally for vague things’.  94  The 
latter point was a reference to the theory of  autogestion , which was subjected 
to a detailed philosophical critique by Jean Baechler in the same issue.  95  
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Although respectful of Rosanvallon, whom he identifi ed as one of the few 
‘serious’ theorists of  autogestion , Baechler ultimately concluded that his 
attempt to defi ne  autogestion as a new form of political liberalism failed. 
Whereas the absolute evil for liberals was tyranny, for the theorist of 
 autogestion , Baechler claimed, this was capitalism. The source of this 
difference originated not in their respective political or economic theories, but 
in their attitudes to modernity, which the authentic liberal stoically accepted 
with all its opportunities and constraints, while  autogestionnaire socialism 
rationalised its ultimate rejection of modernity in the name of anti- capitalism.  96  
 The heterogeneity of the French 
liberal revival 
 As Baechler and Manent’s critiques of Rosanvallon and Lefort show, there 
was signifi cant disagreement between liberal revivalists in France during the 
late 1970s. Yet there was convergence on some key issues. A mutual 
preoccupation with the critique of totalitarianism conceived as the product of 
a failing democratic political culture was one such point of convergence; a 
shared sense that France’s liberal tradition of political thought offered a 
superior means of engaging with this issue was another. Common to the 
authors discussed in this chapter was a sense that a key advantage of this 
liberal tradition was its recognition of the primacy of the political domain; 
studying its authors therefore offered a means of exploring the phenomena of 
democracy and totalitarianism without reducing them to products of structural 
economic forces. This rejection of economic reductionism not only distanced 
these French liberal revivalists from positivistic forms of Marxism, it also 
informed their common, if uneven, scepticism towards classical economic 
liberalism: notwithstanding its opponents’ claims to the contrary, French neo- 
liberalism was far from being a facsimile of its Anglo-American counterpart.  97  
 Among the authors covered in this chapter there existed suffi cient 
common ground on which to develop institutional forms of collaboration 
that would have a lasting impact on the French intellectual landscape. In 
1977, the historian François Furet, a major fi gure in France’s late twentieth- 
century liberal revival, established a seminar at the École des hautes études 
en sciences sociales dedicated to political philosophy, largely as incarnated 
in the French liberal tradition.  98  This seminar was a forerunner of the Institut 
Raymond Aron, founded in 1985, which played an important role in 
consolidating France’s liberal revival and the related reinterpretation of the 
French Revolution promoted by Furet and his colleagues; more broadly, it 
also helped to revive the previously moribund discipline of the history of 
political ideas in France.  99  Through this institute the name of Raymond 
Aron has come to be associated with an expansive, pluralist French liberal 
revival encompassing the work, not only of his close collaborators at 
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 Commentaire , but also of individuals whose intellectual trajectories included 
taking positions on the events of 1968 that were opposed, sometimes 
radically so, to his own. As we have seen, Claude Lefort acknowledged Aron 
as an important infl uence on his intellectual development despite their 
differences over May 68; similarly, François Furet cited Aron as an important 
infl uence but did not share his views on the  événements .  100  Does it, then, 
make sense to speak of a specifi c anti-68 liberal revival inspired by Aron’s 
example? 
 The answer, I think, is yes. The most obvious factor to take into account 
here is the origin of the two journals,  Contrepoint and  Commentaire , in the 
milieu that developed around Aron following his appeal for the formation of 
a Committee for the Defence and Renovation of the French University in the 
summer of 1968. Within the pages of these journals in the 1970s and 1980s 
a specifi c reading of France’s eighteenth- and nineteenth- century liberal 
authors predominated.  101  This interpretation of France’s liberal heritage was 
linked to a project aimed at reforming the political and intellectual culture of 
late- twentieth century France through the interrelated critiques of radical 
egalitarianism, relativist ‘anti- humanism’, and intellectual ‘irresponsibility’. 
These critiques were substantially inspired by Raymond Aron’s Tocquevillian 
analyses of the ‘dialectic of equality’ and May 68. The anti- totalitarianism of 
these journals shared common characteristics with the wider anti- totalitarian 
turn that developed in France from the mid-1970s, including an anachronistic 
tendency to apply the language of totalitarianism to the analysis of authors 
writing in the nineteenth century and earlier. They also tended to regard 
totalitarianism as the product of a malfunctioning democratic political 
culture. But, while other liberal revivalists promoted the benefi ts of an 
effervescent associational life to counteract this, the regular contributors to 
 Commentaire and  Contrepoint emphasised the need to inculcate the right 
kinds of social and political  mœurs , which typically entailed shunning radical 
egalitarianism as socially and politically pernicious. The positive side of this 
equation was the need for intellectuals to embrace an attitude of ‘responsibility’. 
For anti-68 liberals this meant rejecting not only Marxism but also the radical 
relativism of ‘French theory’ in favour of a form of centrist ‘realism’ aimed at 
France’s cultured political and administrative élite.  102  
 The French anti-68 liberal revival has had specifi c intellectual and political 
legacies in France and through its reception in the United States. Thanks in 
large part to Pierre Manent,  Commentaire became an important transmission 
belt for the introduction of American neo- conservative thought into France 
during the 1980s, particularly that of Leo Strauss and Allan Bloom.  103  The 
anti- egalitarian, anti- postmodernist leanings of the anti-68 liberal revival 
chimed with Straussians and other anti- postmodernist intellectuals in the 
United States, who tried, with limited success, to import it in the 1990s.  104  In 
the autumn of 1989 the publication in  Commentaire of the fi rst French 
translation of Francis Fukuyama’s famous article ‘The end of history?’ 
signalled a post-Cold War revival of a more conservative, pro- market variant 
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of end of ideology theory.  105  Debating an apparently post- ideological age 
actually pre- dated the end of the Cold War in French domestic politics, and 
was linked to the electoral decline of the PCF, the infl uence of Furetian 
revisionism in French revolutionary historiography, and the experience of 
political ‘cohabitation’ between 1986 and 1988.  106  Following the collapse of 
communism abroad and the revival of mass social protest at home, however, 
France’s heterogeneous liberal intellectual alliance became increasingly 
fragmented during the 1990s. This process reached a low point in 2002 
when a scandal broke out over the publication in a series edited by Pierre 
Rosanvallon of a book by Daniel Lindenberg attacking Pierre Manent as an 
intellectual reactionary.  107  The involvement of Nicolas Baverez, Raymond 
Aron’s biographer and a regular contributor to  Commentaire , in Nicolas 
Sarkozy’s infamous campaign speech on the need to ‘liquidate the legacy of 
1968’ again highlighted the specifi city of the journal’s liberal vision.  108  By 
this point, though, the intensity of  Commentaire ’s liberal revivalism, as 
measured by the frequency with which the ‘Classics of Liberty’ section ran in 
the journal, had slowed signifi cantly since its peak in the 1970s and 1980s.  109  
However, given that at the time of writing the latest two issues of  Commentaire 
have focused on ‘The Crisis of Liberalism’, perhaps the late twentieth-century 
French liberal renaissance will itself be subjected to an early twenty- fi rst-
century revival.  110  
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